This historical note seeks to provide some markers for economists and policymakers interested in Myanmar’s woeful experience over seven decades when it fell from being one of the most prosperous and promising countries in East Asia at the end of World War II to one of the poorest now.
The most encouraging period of economic progress after Burma’s independence in 1948 was the decade of quasi-democratic governance under the Thein Sein administration from 2011 to 2016 and the National League for Democracy (NLD) administration (led by Aung San Suu Kyi) from 2016 to 2021. On 1 February 2021, a military coup plunged the country back into another chaotic period of civil strife and economic suffering, with no end in sight.
For people interested in Myanmar’s future, it is important to examine the foundations for the economic policy reforms that sparked Myanmar’s joyful economic rise beginning in 2011, assess these reforms as they were carried out during the two administrations, and consider how they may have contributed to the coup in 2021.
This note begins by focusing on the period from 2003 to 2011 when a “Third Force” was active, mediating between the country’s military rulers and the democratic opposition growing out of the 1988 uprising that gained international support through the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the NLD. In this period, the roles of “Myanmar Egress” and the visit of Nobel-laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz are given special attention.
The note goes on to describe somewhat superficially the economic reforms implemented by the Thein Sein administration that arguably contributed crucially to the reforms subsequently implemented during the NLD administration. These reforms, in the five years leading up to the 2021 coup, have been thoroughly described by Sean Turnell, economic advisor to Aung San Suu Kyi (as head of the NLD administration) in his monograph Best Laid Plans. The note finishes with a short set of thoughts about lessons to be drawn and questions to be explored.
